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THE HUMAN CONCEPT IN FIN-DE-SIÈCLE
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
- A comparison between Ljudevit Dvorniković
and Neo-scholastics -

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Abstract: My aim is to investigate one source of our essentialism in the concept of human being at the turn of the century. As its concrete theme, I have chosen the conflict between Darwinism and the neo-scholastics. In particular, I analyze the relationship between Ljudevit Dvorniković and Josip Stadler, because the former endeavored to occupy his place in opposition to the neo-scholastics. Dvorniković regards our human history as a continuous differentiation. On the other hand, the neo-scholastics, especially Stadler regard the history as the growth within each genus. Although Dvorniković historically approached the human being, his metaphysical presupposition prevented him from historicizing the human being totally. His metaphysical presupposition is the notion that the human being as one growing species exists. At this point, he unintentionally has some relationship with his potential enemy, the neo-scholastics. I think one source for the essentialism is such a strange coexistence of the differentiating human being and invariable, although growing, human being.

Key words: Human being, Individuality, Biology, Esthetics, Historiography, Metaphysics, Pedagogy, Psychology, Neo-Scholastics, Ljudevit Dvorniković, and Josip Stadler

Apstrakt: *Moj cilj bio je da istražim izvor našeg esencijalizma u konceptu ljudskog bića na kraju stoljeća. Kao njegovu konkretnu temu, odabrao sam sukob darvinizma i neoskolastičara. Posebno analiziram odnos između Ljudevita Dvornikovića i Josipa Štadlera, jer je prvi radio na tome da zauzme mjesto u opoziciji prema neoskolastičarima. Dvorniković posmatra našu ljudsku historiju kao trajnu diferencijaciju. S druge strane, neoskolastičari, naročito Štadler, vide historiju kao rast unutar svakog roda. Iako je Dvorniković prilazio ljudskom biću historijski, njegova metafizička pretpostavka ga je sprječavala u tome da u potpunosti historicizira ljudsko biće. Njegova metafizička pretpostavka je misao da čovjek egzistira kao jedna rastuća vrsta. Na ovom mjestu on nenamjerno stupa u odnos sa svojim potencijalnim neprijateljima – neoskolastičarima. Mislim da je jedan izvor za esencijalizam tako strana koegzistencija diferencijacije čovjeka i nepromjenljivog, iako rastućeg, ljudskog bića.*

Ključne riječi: *Čovjek, individualnost, biologija, estetika, hIstoriografija, metafizika, pedagogija, psihologija, neoskolastičari, Ljudevit Dvorniković, Josip Štadler.*

Introduction

In Bosnian historiography, we sometimes come across a thesis according to which Bosnian Muslim's identity has never changed since its so-called origin in the Bosnian church. Such an essentialist thesis has no historical authority that is supported by historical documents. Nevertheless, Muhamed Hadžijahić and Mustafa Imamović have continued to endorse this thesis in recent years. A counter thesis argues that various religious sects participated in the conversion to Islam.¹ Another thesis contends that Bosnian Muslim has represented its own identity in the form of various names appropriate to its circumstances. At the same time, this thesis claims that to identify Bosnian Muslim with the Bosnian nation is the product of political social considerations at a certain point in the Bosnian history.² Through these arguments, we can understand the political and socioeconomic motives and conditions

¹ M. Džaja, Srećko, *Konfesionalnost i nacionalnost u Bosni i Hercegovini*. Sarajevo: 1992.

² Miedlig, H-Michael, "Zur Frage der Identität der Muslime in Bosnien-Herzegowina", *Berliner Jahrbuch für osteuropäische Geschichte* 1994, 23-42; Redžić, Enver, *Sto godina muslimanske politike u tezama i kontroverzama istorijske nauke*. Sarajevo: 2000; Juzbašić, Dževad, "Nekoliko napomena o etničkom razvitku u BiH", *Prilozi* 30 (2001), 195-206;

behind such an essentialist thesis and can locate it in the Bosnian historical constellation. However, we cannot solve one serious problem, i. e., why historians would posit the unchangeable essence of one identity in history as the negation of all other essences. Their answers are stereotyped, because they propose two measures, the objective use of historiographical tools and the construction of the historical truth based on facts.³ Yet they forget that such essentialist-historians themselves were confident that their studies were the products of objective historiographical research.

At the turn of the century, such an essentialist thesis appeared in the Bosnian historiography.⁴ As the background for this line of argument, historians pointed out the political motives of the Habsburg Empire, especially those of Benjamin Kallay, the Bosnian governor from 1882 to 1903. He constructed the Bosnian nation on the basis of the concept of a Bosnian Muslim to prevent the penetration of Serbian nationalism into Bosnian Muslim. This was an old trick used by the colonialists that involved squeezing a historical individual into a non-historical category.⁵ Besides such a political motive, we should investigate whether there was also an epistemological underpinning that permitted the connection of the essential events with history. New Historical approach, Darwinism, according to which species evolve by natural selection, had a strong influence on thinkers and intellectuals in Bosnia and Croatia; their thoughts related to not only biology, but also human science. Ljudevit Dvorniković (1861-1933), a professor,⁶ at the Sarajevo Teachers School, a member of the Central Committee of Napredak (1912-1915), a leader of the chorus Trebević, and the chief editor of the magazine *Behar* (1908-1910), employed evolutionary thought to discuss esthetic, pedagogical, and psychological issues in various periodicals in Bos-

Kržišnik-Bukić, Vera, "Historijske i historiografske kontroverze i dileme nacionalnog nominiranja u BiH", *Prilozi* 32 (2003), 297-313.

³ Mušeta-Aščerić, Vesna, "Pojam istinitosti kroz historiju-Historijska istina kao pitanje moralne istine", *Prilozi* 29 (2000), 405-418; Kvarne, Jon, "Da li je Bosni i Hercegovini potrebno stvaranje novih historijskih mitova?" u: *Historijski mitovi na Balkanu*. Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju u Sarajevu, 2003, 85-107.

⁴ Bašagić, Safvet-beg, *Kratka uputa u prošlost Bosne i Hercegovine*. Sarajevo: 1900.

⁵ We could encounter such a trick in texts written during the Ottoman Empire. As to his inspection in 1864, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa likens the Bosnian to a book with an unchangeable content and a broken cover in his memoirs. Ahmed Cevdet paşa, *Tezâkir* 21-39. Ankara: 2. baskı, 1986, 68-69.

⁶ Although Dvorniković had been appointed to the teacher on August 25th 1902, he was promoted to the professor on December 13th 1913. Istorijski Arhiv u Sarajevu, Ostavština Ljudevita Dvornikovića, DLj-4 i DLj-5.

nia and Croatia.⁷ In this paper I analyze his human concept to investigate its epistemological background as the metaphysical basis for all human sciences at that time.

In his memoirs (1909) addressed to Davorin Trstenjak, Dvorniković spoke of having read Antun Kržan's monograph *O postanku čovjeka*, which aroused his interest in Darwinian thought⁸. Kržan was a Croatian neo-scholastic, and his monograph criticized Darwinian thought as representative of materialism.⁹ It is interesting that Dvorniković claimed to have first discovered his method, which was based on evolutionary theory, in an anti-Darwinian neo-scholastic monograph. In his letter of February 20, 1901, he mentioned his opposition to the thought of Ljuboje Dlustuš, chief editor of the pedagogical periodical *Školski Vjensik*, because of Dlustuš's reliance on the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas and his being a scholastic metaphysic who based his ideas on old-fashioned science.¹⁰ In later years, Dvorniković asserted that Dlustuš's clerical ideas separated the two of them.¹¹ Although Dvorniković's memoirs do not honestly reflect his past, it is understandable that he would situate himself in opposition to scholastic thought, as mentioned by the other letters.

First, we should consider how the influence of Darwinian methods in Bosnia and Croatia was evaluated at the turn of the century. To assess the impact of Darwin's thought in Croatia, Vale Vouk examined the conflict between the progressive and liberal mind that was supported by science and the conservative and apprehensive mind that was based on religious dogmatism.¹² Similarly, we can find such opposition to religious thoughts in Antun Bauer's critique of Bogoslav Šulek's treatise *Područje materializma* (1888). Although Josip Balabanić used more documents than Vale Vouk to investigate the Darwinian influence up to 1918, he also considered that

⁷ Rizvić, Muhsin, *Behar*. Sarajevo: 1971, 369-420; Išek, Tomislav, *Mjesto i Uloga HKD Napredak u kulturnom životu Hrvata Bosne i Hercegovine (1902-1918)*. Sarajevo: 2002, 66.

⁸ Pismo 8. studenoga 1909, Arhiv Hrvatskog školskog muzeja (AHŠM), HR-HŠM-50 Trstenjak Davorin, A-1913 Pisma Ljudevita Dvornikovića.

⁹ Although Kržan criticizes that Darwin cannot explain how our lives are generated without the life principle, he recognizes Darwin's method as a supplementary method to understand the physical world. Kržan, Antun, *O postanku čovjeka*. knj. 2, Zagreb: 1877, 263.

¹⁰ Pismo 20. veljača 1901, AHŠM, HR-HŠM-50 Trstenjak Davorin, A-1913 Pisma Ljudevita Dvornikovića.

¹¹ Pismo 5. veljača 1905, AHŠM, HR-HŠM-50 Trstenjak Davorin, A-1913 Pisma Ljudevita Dvornikovića

¹² Vouk, Vale, "Darvinizam u Hrvatskoj, u Marcel Prenant" (prev. od Davor Mikačić), *Darwin Njegov život i djelo*. Zagreb: 1946, 119.

conflict based on its thesis, which represented the crush between the traditional scholastic thought and the positivist approach.¹³

Such a clash between biological thought and scholastic thought has generally been accepted in the history of science. Stjepan Zimmermann, a scholastic successor, evaluated Bauer's works positively, especially his critique of Šulek, in order to secure the independence of philosophy and metaphysics against the philosophical naturalization caused by psychologism.¹⁴ In the sphere of ideal history, we can also verify the acceptance of this opposition.¹⁵

Nevertheless, recently Tomislav Bracanović has indicated that the room for negotiations between Bauer and Šulek would have existed if they had both maintained their composure.¹⁶ We should examine that opposition anew, as attested to by Dvorniković and other contemporaries and historians. Is it possible that the historical approach, like the evolutionary method, did not necessarily sweep away the so-called scholastic thought? Somewhere, we might find the hidden link to scholastic thought.

What is neo-scholasticism? Since the latter half of the 19th century, individuals have tried to modernize the Catholic theology and philosophy by critically accepting the results of contemporary natural science, as based on the scholastic tradition in Italy, Spain, France, and Germany.¹⁷ Pope Leo 13's encyclical *Aeterni Patris* (1879), which authorized the modernization of theology and philosophy on the basis of Aquinas, promoted neo-scholasticism to the official theology and philosophy among Roman Catholic thinkers. Such a new stream of thoughts instantly influenced the Catholic-dominated Croatia.¹⁸

¹³ Balabanić, Josip, *Darvinizam u Hrvatskoj Fenomen darvinizma u hrvatskoj prirodnoj znanosti i društvu do kraja prvog svjetskog rata*. Zagreb: 1983, 83.

¹⁴ Zimmermann, Stjepan, "Nadbiskup kao filozofski pisac", u: Janko Barlè i Svetozar Ritig (ured.), *Zagrebački Nadbiskup Dr. Antun Bauer u životu i djelu O njegovom zlatnom svećeničkom jubileju 28. srpnja 1929*. Zagreb: 1929, 25; Zimmermann, Stjepan, "Bauer kao filozof" (1939), u: Ivan Čehok (pri.), *O hrvatskoj filozofiji i kulturi*. Zagreb: 2001, 81-100.

¹⁵ Križanić, Zora, *A. Bauer i njegova filozofija*. Zagreb: 1986, 104.

¹⁶ Bracanović, Tomislav, "Problem naravi ljudskog duha u sporu između Bogoslava Šuleka i Antuna Bauera", *Scopus* God.4-sv.3-br.13/14 (2000 travanj), 23.

¹⁷ Macan, Ivan, "Kršćanska filozofija u katoličkoj misli 19. i 20. stoljeća (II)–prvi dio", *Obnovljeni život* svezak 49-br. 2 (1994), 167-189.

¹⁸ Gruber, Cvjetko, "Kršćanska filozofija po katoličkim školah u duhu angjeoskoga učitelja sv. Tome Akvinjanina obzirom na najnoviju encikliku *Aeterni Patris*", *Katolički list* 1880, 49.

Some representative philosophers and theologians of neo-scholasticism came from Croatia.¹⁹ I selected Josip Stadler (1843-1918) in my paper because of the following two reasons. On one hand, he was the archbishop of Vrhbosna in Sarajevo from 1881 to 1918 and can be regarded as a representative of the Bosnian Catholics at the turn of the century. On the other hand, he was an important leader of the neo-scholastic movement in Croatia and Bosnia because he received a doctorate philosophy in 1865 and a doctorate in theology in 1869.²⁰ Then, he taught on the theological faculty at the University of Zagreb. In the early 20th century, he published six volumes titled *Filozofija*. Although these volumes were used as textbooks in the Vrhbosna Catholic Seminary (*Vrhbosanska visoka teološka škola*) that he established, the purpose of these volumes was to present the neo-scholastic philosophy systematically and their use as a textbook was a secondary result.²¹ He was the only person to systematize neo-scholastic philosophy in Bosnia and Croatia.

As for Dvorniković's *Essay-i iz područja psihološke pedagogije i estetike* (1905), his contemporary, Dimitrije Mitrinović, criticized it, saying "This is not an essay. These works resulted from suggestive psychological and scientific research. It is more important than anything else that these works be based on scientific excellence."²² Some thinkers like Mitrinović welcomed his contemporary's biological approach to esthetics and pedagogy, although many thinkers at that time were not pleased by such a Darwinian approach.²³ In 1921, Dragutin Prohaska also made a positive critique of Dvorniković's work, although with some reservations.²⁴ His esthetics and psychology were neglected for a long time.²⁵ Starting in the 1970s,

¹⁹ Josipović, Marko, "Pojam i pregled razvoja neoskolastike", *Filozofska istraživanja* God. 14-sv. 2-3 (1994), 448-450.

²⁰ Šarić, Ivan, "Nadbiskup dr. Josip Stadler k njegovoj zlatnoj misi", *Vrhbosna* 1918, 131.

²¹ Posavac, Zlatko, "Umjetnost i pojam ljepote u Hrvatskoj neoskolastici 5. Josip Stadler prvi hrvatskim jezikom eksplicite kao cjelina izveden i tiskom objavljen (neoskolastički) filozofski sustav", *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, God. 27-br. 1-2 (2001), 192-193.

²² Ljudevit Dvorniković, "Essay- i iz područja psihološke pedagogije i estetike", *Bosanska Vila* God. 26-broj 6 (1911 Februar), 94.

²³ Pismo 27. ožujka 1893 od Milana Kobalića, Istorijski Arhiv u Sarajevu, Ostavština Ljudevita Dvornikovića, DLj-22.

²⁴ Prohaska, Dragutin, *Pregled savremene hrvatsko-srpske književnosti*. Zagreb: 1921, 148.

²⁵ Fiamengo, Ante, "Ljudevit Dvorniković", u: *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije*. Beograd: 1958.

however, Dvorniković's work began to be reevaluated.²⁶ Zlatko Posavac also favorably considered his esthetics as "experiential" on the basis of biological psychology grounded in positivism and induction and asserted that he was a pioneer of the Croatian Moderne.²⁷ In his evaluation of Dvorniković, Posavac pointed out a feature of his esthetics as focusing more on feelings than recognition in comparison with the neo-scholastic esthetics.²⁸ Nevertheless, Posavac does not show how Dvorniković interpreted the esthetic experience by analyzing some of his texts, nor does he concretely compare his texts with those of the neo-scholastics to indicate both sides' of the conflict. Although recently, Posavac intensively analyzed the neo-scholastic esthetics, especially those of Stadler, his intention was to research the features of Stadler's esthetics in comparison with those of his contemporary neo-scholastics.²⁹

Since 1900 Dvorniković himself affirmed his intellectual position in opposition to scholastic thought. In fact, his contemporary, Mitrović, gave his first book a positive evaluation as a biological and scientific contribution to Bosnian intellectual thought. His first book, *Essay-i iz područja psihološke pedagogije i estetike*, consists of his earlier articles published during the 1890s in the periodicals *Nada* and *Napredak*.³⁰ His second book, *Temelji psihologije*, is intended for students' use at his Teachers School because Stjepan Basariček's text was considered biased and out-dated.³¹ In 1911, he published his third book, *Uzgojna ideja u kulturnoj povijesti čovječanstva*. In this book he expressed his eagerness to write a modern and critical cultural history, because he felt it was needed in the school.³² His main works were published intensively at the turn of the century. Therefore, in this paper, it is appro-

²⁶ Bazala, Vladimir, *Pregled hrvatske znanstvene baštine*. Zagreb: 1978, 352.

²⁷ Posavac, Zlatko, "Jedan zaboravljeni estetičar Psihologističko-pozitivistička estetika Ljudevita Dvornikovića", u: *Novija Hrvatska Estetika Studije i Eseji*. Zagreb: 1991, 135-136.

²⁸ Isto, 137. i 141.

²⁹ Zlatko Posavac, "Umjetnost i pojam ljepote u Hrvatskoj neoskolastici 5. Josip Stadler prvi hrvatskim jezikom eksplicite kao cjelina izveden i tiskom objavljen (neoskolastički) filozofski sustav", *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, God. 27-br. 1-2 (2001), 163-205, God. 28-br. 1-2 (2002), 207-238. i God. 29-br. 1-2 (2003), 93-162.

³⁰ Pismo 13. siječanja (?) 1906, AHŠM, HR-HŠM-50 Trstenjak Davorin, A-1913 Pisma Ljudevita Dvornikovića.

³¹ Pismo 28. siječanja 1904, AHŠM, HR-HŠM-50 Trstenjak Davorin, A-1913 Pisma Ljudevita Dvornikovića.

³² Pismo 28. svibnja 1910, AHŠM, HR-HŠM-50 Trstenjak Davorin, A-1913 Pisma Ljudevita Dvornikovića.

priate to consider mainly his works that appeared during this period as the primary documents. This study is also based on his manuscripts found in some Archives.

Dvorniković did not write an ontological work. He discussed various phenomena related to human beings through his biological and evolutionary psychology. Therefore it is not possible to understand his human concept through an analysis of his ontology. The first chapter analyzes his and neo-scholastic esthetic sense, which is related to intellect and emotion. The second chapter focuses on the concept of character, which is related to will. The third chapter analyzes how Dvorniković and the neo-scholastics understood or used the concept of history, which has relationships with intellect, emotion, and will.

1. Esthetic sense in Dvorniković's and neo-scholastic thought

1-1. Esthetic sense before Dvorniković

The authors of earlier Croatian pedagogical articles mention esthetic sense from the viewpoint that values beauty in relation to human beings. They interpret beauty as lifting irrational animals up to the level of human beings and coloring their life with luxury.³³ Stèpan Novotny defines esthetic sense as the emotion that is achieved through discovering and acquiring all the beauty in a single object.³⁴ He thinks that esthetic sense is the emotional product of the recognition of a beautiful object, and he and other authors of such articles believe that recognition necessarily precedes esthetic sense.

Starting in the latter half of the 1870s, some books on psychology in Croatian language appeared and help us understand how they interpreted esthetic sense psychologically. Although esthetic sense is an emotion elicited by beauty, it is not same as pleasure (*ugodnost*), because the latter is related to the material while the former is related to the form; we can think of beauty as separated from the object itself. Concretely beauty is a complicated harmony.³⁵ Even if we could perceive beauty through form, its form is restricted by the content or ideas. Although the ideas themselves have only a logical character, they can acquire an esthetic function while being in-

³³ Ilijašević, Stèpan, *Obuka malenih ili katechetika koju za porabu svjetjenikah učiteljah voditeljjah i svih prijateljjah mladoga naraštaja*. Zagreb: 1850, 204.

³⁴ Novotny, Stèpan, *Gojitba i obča učba*. Beč: 1867, 56.

³⁵ Basariček, Stjepan, *Kratko izkustveno dušoslovje*. Zagreb: 1877, 56.

carnated in the esthetic form.³⁶ Therefore, it is important for esthetic sense to recognize such ideas in the form. In this regard Josip Glaser comments that “diving into the essence”,³⁷ is an indispensable condition for esthetic enjoyment.

In the 1890s, they call the object that caused its representation and elicited a fond emotion (*milja*) “beauty”. Such emotion is not the same as pleasure. As to the former, we can indicate its cause, while as to the latter, we cannot separate it solely, because it is closely connected with the sense organs with which it is concerned.³⁸ Therefore, these thinkers state, “beauty is produced by the material’s union with supernatural elements”.³⁹ The external condition for beauty is the harmony of the parts that compose the whole, and internal condition is the base or idea on which such a harmony exists.⁴⁰

Nevertheless, in reality, an object can rarely satisfy all people in terms of its being beautiful. As a result, these thinkers assert what changes as not beauty itself but rather as the person making esthetic judgments. Therefore, they recommend overcoming the observers’ own anticipation, desires, and inclinations as an indispensable precondition for esthetic enjoyment.⁴¹ Thus, they consider that beauty is eternal and may elicit esthetic sense in any person. Such a thought still maintains its validity.⁴² They regard intellectual growth as necessary for esthetic sense to satisfy its internal condition.

As mentioned above, they interpreted esthetic sense as one compound product that resulted from discovering the harmony in complicated phenomena and recognizing the idea as its harmony’s base in the pedagogical and psychological sphere starting in the 1850s. Recognition is an indispensable precondition for esthetic sense. Thus, these thinkers always separate esthetic fondness from physiological pleasure. In addition, they regard the variety of esthetic sense as the secondary result caused by the interference of the other senses, moods, or circumstances. Therefore, they consider that beauty would be the same for all people if we could eliminate such interfering factors.

³⁶ *Isto*, 57.

³⁷ Glaser, Josip, *Oris psihologije*, *Napredak*. Tečaj 18, 1877, 107.

³⁸ Arnold, Đuro, *Psihologija za srednja učilišta*. Zagreb: drugo izdanje, 1895, 92-94.

³⁹ Posedel, Josip, *Empirična psihologija za školsku i privatnu potrebu*. Senj: 1892, 101.

⁴⁰ Arnold, Đuro, *nav. djelo*, 97.

⁴¹ *Isto*, 58.

⁴² Posedel, Josip, *nav. djelo*, 102.

1-2. Esthetic sense of Dvorniković

The human inclination toward beauty is based on the specific sense called esthetic sense. At the same time, a question arises regarding the relationship between esthetic sense and its object. Herbert Spencer asserted that mental organs adapt themselves to their circumstances and esthetic sense is an effect of its organ. On the other hand, Wilhelm Wundt responded that we should focus on the mutual effects between esthetic sense and its object, without considering which of the two has priority.⁴³ Assenting to the latter, Dvorniković proposes that the satisfaction of needs is a key for understanding all mental activities. Even if the sublime, truthful, and perfect object is beauty, as the esthetics asserted, we cannot understand why it makes us feel pleasant.⁴⁴ He researches his response on the basis of the current knowledge of the human mind.

Where is esthetic sense located? Because until now other thinkers had contended that it was located in the mind, they had neglected the physical side, Dvorniković claimed.⁴⁵ Therefore, beauty became something transcendental that existed outside the human being. Our ordinary experiences confirm, however, that all pleasant feelings such as the satisfaction of hunger and the enjoyment of music or the plastic arts are generated in the physical organs. Thus, we should not distinguish the satisfaction of vegetable activities such as hunger from esthetic sense because all these senses are generated in the physical organs.⁴⁶ For avoiding the problem that could be caused by the dual perspective of mind and body, he analyzes the given connection between the senses and the physical organs on the basis of the experience of feeling something that always occurs in our body.⁴⁷ In such a way, he can return the human being to the vital sphere composed of animals and plants.

Therefore, as a result of the differentiation of the physical organization, all mental activities have their center in the physical organs.⁴⁸ Concretely, while explaining the growth of the child's brain, Dvorniković thinks that the center of the esthet-

⁴³ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, O psihološkim osnovima estetskog osjećaja, u *Essay-i iz područja psihološke pedagogije i estetike*. Sarajevo: 1905a, 78.

⁴⁴ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, O psihološkim osnovima estetskog osjećaja, *Nada* God. 7-br. 4, 1901, 55.

⁴⁵ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1905a, 83.

⁴⁶ *Isto*, 83.

⁴⁷ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1901, 72.

⁴⁸ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1905a, 85.

ic sense is the brain. The accumulation of knowledge about the circumstances regulates the pattern of human activities. Such accumulation simultaneously encourages the differentiation of each organ that carries out each activity. First, an organism responds to its circumstances reflectively. In parallel with the accumulation of knowledge about its circumstances, it begins to perform a conscious response and make recognition. Finally, it can subjectively select the means appropriate to its needs. Such growth enables it to recognize its place in the natural and social constellation through the activity of thought.⁴⁹ At the same time, new needs are generated daily from such a deepened recognition about the relationship between the self and the outside world. These needs encourage the organic differentiation. An activity leaves its trace in the concerned organ when a person repeats the activity related to the fixed organs. We can perceive such a trace as the inclination (*sklonost*) toward the given activity.⁵⁰ Such an inclination has some influence on the person's descendants through the heredity. Dvorniković calls such inclinations "mental capital".⁵¹

Even if the differentiation of the organ occurs through the accumulation of knowledge, it often happens that the organ's need cannot be satisfied in everyday life. Then, this need becomes the potential to wait for a good opportunity. The satisfaction of the needs allows us to feel pleasant when the need is able to find the opportunity to be satisfied. Its trigger is esthetic object. Therefore, the need for esthetic enjoyment also results from the need to acquire and order the representatives about the circumstances in harmony with the concerned organism's wealth.⁵² Although the sublime is closely related to fear, its observer always keeps the sublime object safe, and then, the sublime is not same as the fear. Breeding is an origin of the enjoyment of female beauty.⁵³ "Even if esthetic sense seems to be independent of our wealth,

⁴⁹ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1901, 73.

⁵⁰ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1905a, 87.

⁵¹ *Isto*, 91.

⁵² Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1901, 74. Cf. the broadened knowledge and representative of its object always accompanies the sensitive judgment about it. Therefore our aesthetic sense is a phenomenon that parallels our physical emotions. Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *Uzgojni dojam beletristike*, u *Essay-i iz područja psihološke pedagogije i estetike*. Sarajevo: 1905b, 51-75. And Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *Govor umjetnosti*, u *Essay-i iz područja psihološke pedagogije i estetike*. Sarajevo: 1905c, 93-116.

⁵³ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1905a, 89.

such independence is merely an illusion”.⁵⁴ In opposition to the earlier esthetics, Dvorniković tries to relate the esthetic sense to physical pleasure. Thus, he succeeds in affirming that beauty is not independent of our being human.

His so-called physical esthetics would gain support from the contemporary evolutionary theory, which would lead to the end of the transcendental approach to esthetics. Evolutionary theory has enabled him to consider that the present state is not eternally constant but rather the effect of historical development.⁵⁵ Simultaneously, this theory has brought him another clue for analyzing esthetic sense: “We should not place each phenomenon outside evolution but connect it to *one organic whole* as its origin, and then, we should research the cause for the various phenomena in the differentiation from it”.⁵⁶

While analyzing the history of esthetics, his thought, according to which the human being is a part of the organic whole, led him to consider the origin of esthetic sense that is common for all people.⁵⁷ He cites the ornament as an expression of the ancient esthetic sense. After people satisfied their minimum physical needs for their lives, the inclination for the ornament appeared.⁵⁸ According to this phenomenon, the connection with the organic needs does not completely disappear. It still has a connection as a function of sex appeal that leads its human descendants to breed. Therefore, it can be said that the current fashion is a trace whose biological origin has been forgotten.⁵⁹

Dvorniković examines that, in reality, we encounter various fashion styles. The relationship between the human being and nature has two aspects: external circumstances influence individual or the species either positively or negatively. A positive influence causes pleasant emotions, while a negative experience causes unpleasant emotions. Ever since human beings started dealing with their environment, they continually adapted themselves to their circumstance, which had a positive effect on their organic development. Such effects caused pleasant emotions, which left their traces as habits. These habits contribute in enabling human beings to adapt them-

⁵⁴ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *Temelji psihologije*. Zagreb: 1906, 108. Cf. its second version was published at Sarajevo in 1912.

⁵⁵ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1905a, 79-80.

⁵⁶ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1901, 55.

⁵⁷ *Isto*, 56.

⁵⁸ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1905a, 80.

⁵⁹ *Isto*, 80.

selves to their living conditions.⁶⁰ For example, the reason why we like to be in sunlight is that it satisfies the organic need for light.⁶¹ An organ performing a fixed activity is not differentiated in the human beings but rather in each individual organ, according to each circumstance. Therefore, the various conditions surrounding each individual prevent human beings from becoming the same. Such circumstances include social situations, pedigree, and mental and physical features.⁶² Even if the natural environment is the same, all the people living in that environment do not always acquire the same esthetic sense because there are also other different circumstances.

The esthetic sense has its origin in physical needs, especially the need for existence. In parallel with the accumulation of knowledge about external circumstances, its needs get multiplied. Simultaneously, the organs, especially the nervous system, also become differentiated. Therefore, the esthetic sense separates itself from the need for existence and differentiates itself gradually. The differentiation of the esthetic sense or its organs is generated from three factors: the representatives or knowledge about various circumstances, consciousness about the self in its constellation, and the pleasant emotions that result from the adaptation of the esthetic sense to its circumstances.

1-3. Esthetic sense in neo-scholastic thought

1-3-1. Concept of sense in neo-scholastic thought

As to the esthetic sense, Stadler briefly defines it as “the mental inclination generated by the recognition of the beautiful or ugly objects”.⁶³ He considers beauty within the framework of the perfection of being. All beings in this world are not absolutely perfect, because the only absolutely perfect being is God. All creatures have something imperfect about them. Although all creatures cannot reach their absolute perfection because of their being imperfect, they will endeavor to achieve their relative perfection. Ultimately, the perfection at which all beings aim is the perfect actualization of the self.⁶⁴ He considers this proposition from three viewpoints. First is the perfection concerning the actuality (*stvarnost*). On the basis of this, the being is

⁶⁰ *Isto*, 81.

⁶¹ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1901, 57.

⁶² Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *Uzgoj i prirojene sklonosti*, u *Essay-i iz područja psihološke pedagogije i estetike*, Sarajevo: 1905d, 33.

⁶³ Stadler, Josip, *Psihologija*. Sarajevo: 1910, 298.

⁶⁴ Stadler, Josip, *Opća metafisika ili ontologija*. Zagreb: reprint, 2004, 147.

classified as a simple or a compound being.⁶⁵ Although the simple being is perfect in itself, its parts compose its essence so that the compound being can achieve its perfection.⁶⁶

Second is the perfection concerning the way (*način*). It is classified into three parts. The first classifies all beings under the necessary and contingent beings by self. The second classifies them under the eternal and temporal beings. The last classifies them under the variable and invariable beings. It is impossible for a necessary being to be absent. This can be only God. All contingent beings can actualize themselves only by the actual existence of their precedent necessary being.⁶⁷ The invariable being includes the necessity in itself. The variable being includes the contingency in itself. All variable beings have some potentiality in themselves because to be variable means that a being can incessantly acquire or lose some actuality. Thus, all variable beings are imperfect.⁶⁸

Third is the perfection concerning the relationship (*odnošaj*). In this way Stadler classifies the beings in terms of order and beauty. For order, we should first recognize the relationships among the objects and then establish the rule according to which we can order them, because order means to set the objects in order for a fixed purpose. Therefore, the order can be actualized only by the rational being.⁶⁹ The order in nature is actualized only by one primary cause, namely God.

Although such beauty is based on its truth, especially the brightness of its truth, it alone cannot let its observer feel fondness. The basis for such an esthetic emotion is the particular circumstance of its object. First, this means the proportion that shows its union on the basis of its essence, because its object is the compound being. Then, it indicates its connection with brightness. By such brightness, its observers can easily recognize its object's form through the ordered proportion.⁷⁰ Therefore, beauty is the object ordered on the basis of a fixed rule. In addition, the esthetic sense means that its rule's recognition is accompanied by fond emotion.

As to the objects, beauty is classified under sensitive and mental categories. Although the intellect recognizes sensitive beauty, it is found in physical objects as far as its beauty depends on the function of sensitive organs, especially the optic and au-

⁶⁵ *Isto*, 149.

⁶⁶ *Isto*, 151-152.

⁶⁷ *Isto*, 157-158.

⁶⁸ *Isto*, 160-161.

⁶⁹ *Isto*, 162-163.

⁷⁰ *Isto*, 166.

ditory senses. Concretely, it means symmetry and harmony. Mental beauty is something we can recognize in non-physical objects. Ultimately, it means to recognize God. Human being as a creature cannot directly recognize such non-physical objects, so we recognize them indirectly through physical objects. It is mental beauty that we can recognize it in so far as its objects have some relationships with non-physical objects. Therefore, sensitive beauty is the recognition of the external side, which appears as a proportion. Mental beauty, then, is the recognition of the idea covered by such a proportion.⁷¹ Here, its proportion functions to express its idea. God as a non-physical being is necessary, invariable, and simple; hence, God is absolutely perfect.

Whoever possesses intellect as an ability to recognize can recognize beauty and feel the esthetic sense. Nevertheless, the esthetic sense is the accompanying phenomenon of recognition. Hence, there is an indispensable condition to develop the intellect.⁷²

1-3-2. Concept of intellect in neo-scholastic thought

How can our human being recognize beauty as a type of perfection of a being? Our human being consists of soul and body. Some faculties (*moć*) are the mediators for the soul to act in the real world. After the development of organic life based on vegetative life, the sensitive life appears. And then the intellectual life emerges. Our human soul transmits its own substantiality to its body neither through its intellect nor will, but through its vegetative and sensitive faculties.⁷³ Nevertheless, this does not mean our intellect is absolutely independent of our senses, because our rational intellect develops from our senses.⁷⁴ Moreover, our senses provide our thinking with its materials, so our thinking is dependent on our senses.⁷⁵

Our sensitive faculty is the power to perceive material objects in cooperation with our body. Its organ represents our sensitive organs.⁷⁶ Our sensitive organs can function to the extent that our body permits. Yet, our senses themselves cannot select their objects arbitrarily. Therefore, objects have to stimulate each sensitive organ

⁷¹ *Isto*, 167.

⁷² *Isto*.

⁷³ Stadler, Josip, *nav. djelo*, 1910, 72.

⁷⁴ *Isto*, 78.

⁷⁵ *Isto*, 81.

⁷⁶ *Isto*, 118-119.

to produce a sensitive perception. When this occurs, our sensitive perception means not only the function that its object produces its own picture (*slika*) in our sensitive organ. But also our sense itself applies its own force (*sila*) to its objects reflectively because what our sense perceives is not only the sensitive picture but also its objects themselves. Such a receptive function is called the feeling (*osjećanje*). Our sensitive picture is the principle that determines our sense to perceive its objects represented through such a sensitive picture. In other words, our sensitive picture is the medium through which our sensitive faculty actualizes as our sensitive act. Such application is called the sensitive perception.⁷⁷ For example, the past, which is an object of our memory, lies not in the object itself but in an act such as our sensitive perception.⁷⁸ Such sensitive perception is called the external sense. In addition, we have the internal sense, by which we can perceive that we perform sensitive activities and can differentiate one external sense from another. Our central nervous system takes charge of such an internal sense.⁷⁹ When we are able to perceive objects that cannot be ordinarily perceived, using only our sensitive faculties, such a faculty is our faculty of sensitive recognition (*razmniva*). For example, its object is the profit or loss that its object has toward its observer. Such a potentiality is not intellectual but sensitive because all animals possess it. Our intellect can discuss the peculiarity that belongs to its subject, namely our intellect can recognize the peculiarity itself. On the other hand, our faculty of sensitive recognition can reduce its peculiarity to its subject, namely our faculty of sensitive recognition can merely perceive that its peculiarity belongs to the subject perceived by our senses. Nevertheless, our human being has an intellect, so our faculty of sensitive recognition can judge its objects in cooperation with our intellect through a comparison of its objects.⁸⁰ Moreover, our sensitive perception cannot recognize its objects' essence and nature, because our sensitive faculty can function to the extent that its objects affect it.⁸¹ To perform such functions is our intellect.

Our intellectual faculty is intended to recognize immaterial objects.⁸² The relationship between our intellect and its objects is the same that in the case of our sensitive perception. Our intellect determines itself by actualizing to the extent that its

⁷⁷ *Isto*, 125-126.

⁷⁸ *Isto*, 145.

⁷⁹ *Isto*, 131.

⁸⁰ *Isto*, 142-143.

⁸¹ *Isto*, 128.

⁸² *Isto*, 159.

objects relate themselves to our intellect.⁸³ The picture that our sense acquires exists as a fantasy in our soul when its objects are absent.⁸⁴ To relate itself to the absent objects, our soul relates itself directly to its picture in a fantasy. Such a fantasy exists under the governance of our sensitive faculty, so our intellect has to depend indirectly on our sensitive faculty. Nevertheless, our senses merely offer our intellectual faculty its materials. The object for our intellect is the immaterial essence that exists as being unified with the matter in this real world.⁸⁵ Through our intellectual faculty, we can tear the essence from its object and recognize it, because our intellectual acts are not restricted by our body even if the former has some relationship with the latter.⁸⁶ The intellectual object is something that constructs its essence, not something that determines its essence within each object. Therefore, the essence freed from its matter is not individual but universal.⁸⁷ Such an essence exists as a form for our intellectual faculty because the picture as a sensitive product cannot represent the essence as being universal within its object itself. All sensitive faculties are partial and material. They are merely a stimulus. The picture related to its essence can only actualize our intellectual faculty into intellectual recognition.⁸⁸ Such a picture representing the essence is called the intellectual picture. This is the form for our intellectual faculty.⁸⁹ Such an intellectual picture is not the object we perceive but rather a medium for our intellect to reach its object's essence. Therefore, our intellect has two dimensions, the active intellect and the passive intellect. The former produces the intellectual picture, while the latter receives it to actualize our total intellectual faculty.⁹⁰ Each essence lies in each matter. In other words, it is in a potential state. The sensitive picture in a fantasy urges our active intellect to produce its intellectual picture. Then, our passive intellect accepts it, and thus, our intellectual faculty actualizes itself to recognize its object's essence.⁹¹ The essence exists at the point at which it

⁸³ *Isto*, 160.

⁸⁴ *Isto*, 133.

⁸⁵ *Isto* 162.

⁸⁶ *Isto*, 164.

⁸⁷ *Isto*, 165.

⁸⁸ *Isto*, 166-167.

⁸⁹ *Isto*, 167.

⁹⁰ *Isto* 169.

⁹¹ *Isto*, 169. Cf. "This passive signifies not any negative meaning but the transformation from its potentiality to its actuality." *Isto*, 174.

is freed from all material qualities. The result produced by such actualization is the concept called the rational language. The intellectual picture is the cause for our intellectual faculty. On the other hand, the concept is the ultimate end for our intellectual activities.⁹² The contingent being needs one precedent cause to actualize itself. We can perceive that the precedent cause is indispensable for the contingent being because our reason draws one appreciation from another. Through such a chain of rational activities, our human being can recognize the perfect being, ultimately the existence of God, as a necessary and invariable being.

2. Character as ideal human

2-1. Concept of character in the latter half of the 19th century

Croatian and Bosnian pedagogy became to focus on the concept of character in the latter half of the 19th century. Stěpan Iliášević emphasizes the importance of our will by steadily obeying the ethical principle, although he does not use the term character. According to him, the aim of the education of our will is to overcome evil by concentrating our thoughts on God and to seek for the object that our intellect has judged as goodness.⁹³ Later, such seeking for the purpose our intellect judges as goodness comes to be called character.⁹⁴ All beings seek the object appropriate to their nature and avoid the objects inappropriate to their nature. Such seeking is transformed into a fixed inclination through repeated activities. Although the impulse seeks its satisfaction through a pleasant emotion, our will seeks for the present unpleasant object or evades the present pleasant object in accordance with our anticipation. Regardless of such emotions and profit, our will can seek for the objects appropriate to the truth, goodness, and beauty.⁹⁵ On one hand, our intellect functions to understand the relationship among the various phenomena as the basis for our anticipation. On the other hand, our reason cooperates to recognize the ultimate cause, namely God, as the basis for our principle of the truth, goodness, and beauty.⁹⁶

Since the 1870s, psychological monographs have discussed the relationship between the course of our desire and our representatives on the basis of the association

⁹² *Isto*, 174-175.

⁹³ Iliášević, Stěpan., *nav. djelo*, 219-222.

⁹⁴ Novotny, Stěpan., *nav. djelo*, 65.

⁹⁵ *Isto*, 63.

⁹⁶ *Isto*, 50.

theory.⁹⁷ When we become conscious of the attainability of our desire and its means besides its object, our desire develops into our will. Our intellectual experiences can become capable of anticipating its attainability. Pondering over its purpose further develops our will: "As many and similar representatives produce the general representative, many and similar activities produce our will. As the general representative could be completed into the concept by our thought, our will is transformed into a fixed principle by our repeated thinking and our consistent decision."⁹⁸

It is interesting that these authors distinguished the impulse from the instinct. The instinct has only a set way to achieve its satisfaction, because it urges its animals unconsciously to look for the objects appropriate to their nature on the basis of their organic peculiarities. Therefore, it has no choice about its objects, unlike our impulse.⁹⁹ Although accepting the similarity between our human being and animals, the authors of these articles firmly discriminated between them. We can still observe such a distinction between our impulse and animal instincts during the 1890s.¹⁰⁰

The known representative can stimulate our desire more strongly because of the smoother apperception. The tendency to consider the character on the basis of the association theory was still evident among Bosnian and Croatian scholars in the 1890s.¹⁰¹ Our reason judges the ethical value as it relates to our will.¹⁰² The authors call us the characters only when we can control our own behaviors in accordance with such judgment.¹⁰³

At that time, thinkers and philosophers seemed to interpret the difficulty of being the character as related to the gradualness of our growth. Our principle is first based on our pleasant emotion and then on intellectual thought about what we will gain. Finally, it is based on ethical judgment.¹⁰⁴ Our reason becomes practicable when our thought goes beyond only understanding the relationships among the phenomena and becomes capable of pondering its ultimate cause. Therefore, they attribute the cause of the difficulty of being the character to such difficult and gradual

⁹⁷ Basariček, Stjepan, *nav. djelo*, 75.

⁹⁸ *Isto*, 81.

⁹⁹ *Isto*, 75.

¹⁰⁰ Posedel, Josip, *nav. djelo*, 119.

¹⁰¹ *Isto*, 114.

¹⁰² *Isto*, 125-126.

¹⁰³ *Isto*, 131.

¹⁰⁴ Basariček, Stjepan, *nav. djelo*, 81-82.

growth from our intellect to our reason. According to Đuro Arnold, to educate the character is to overcome our egoism and make us obey the general principle. Here, such education inevitably accompanies the internal struggle.¹⁰⁵ Even if we can consider the term inheritance as a factor of the difficulty in their articles, they never concretely explain its mechanism.¹⁰⁶

2-2. Concept of character in Dvorniković's thought

A child renews his given knowledge whenever he receives some stimulus from his external world. Such renewed knowledge reminds him of its accompanying pleasant emotion. As a result, the child will acquire its object. Our will signifies our attempt to reject our knowledge that has caused an unpleasant emotion or to recover our knowledge that has caused a pleasant emotion to come into our consciousness.¹⁰⁷ Such physical emotion caused by our representatives has some relationship with our own welfare and is the starting point of our will's development.¹⁰⁸

Our representatives are generated and accumulated through our own observation and recognition. Our mind consists of those representatives. An external stimulus pushes one representative into our consciousness, while removing another given representative. In other words, each relationship among our representatives occasionally constructs our consciousness. The latter is called association.¹⁰⁹ It is important for our mental activities to construct a relationship between the new representative and our given one. Such activity is called apperception. Like the authors of abovementioned articles, Dvorniković also emphasizes that our mental life consists of our acquired representatives and that apperception functions as an important mediator among our inner contents, namely representatives. Although he states that our intellect, as based on our accumulated representatives, can regulate the tendency of our will and that we should consistently obey our conviction on the basis of our apperceived group of representatives, he does not necessarily reduce our will to our representatives' relationships.¹¹⁰ For our will, he approves the important functions of our pleasant or unpleasant emotions that each representative can produce: "The will

¹⁰⁵ Arnold, Đuro, *nav. djelo*, 129-130.

¹⁰⁶ *Isto*, 128.

¹⁰⁷ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1906, 22.

¹⁰⁸ *Isto*, 120.

¹⁰⁹ *Isto*, 44.

¹¹⁰ *Isto*, 120-129.

is the expression of the union between all emotions and all knowledge, which construct this I. Such union colors its will (Herbert Spencer)”¹¹¹

In order that our internal content may be realized as our will, our representative of its object should be associated with that about its attainability. Such a representative of attainability needs its precedent experiences. Our apperceived representatives with our pleasant emotions, produced through our repeated experiences, become the precondition for all our will. Dvorniković then emphasizes the interrelationship between our nervous system and mental activities. Our mental habit is closely related to improving the fluency of our nervous system through its repeated use.¹¹² Therefore, he recommends that we search for the cause of our resistance to a fixed activity in the structure of our nervous system.¹¹³

For him, our representatives and our apperception are the keys necessary to understand our will’s mechanism. The cause for our voluntary phenomenon is not our will’s power but the effect produced by the adaptation of our vitality into our representative’s contents.¹¹⁴ The organ for such activity is our nervous system. Therefore, its growth has a decisive effect on all our mental activities: “The intellectual development within each individual depends not only on the quantity of its acquired knowledge but also on the developmental degree of its nervous system.”¹¹⁵

As to our will, his insistence seems the same as his precedent one that we should apperceive our representatives through our repeated experiences, although he considers the important function of our nervous system. Nevertheless, we can observe that his original thinking is different from his precedent opinions. He calls our activities caused by our vital need without any external stimulus the “impulse” or “instinct.” Unlike his predecessors, he would never establish any border between our human being and other animals.¹¹⁶ His attitude regarding our human being as a part of all animals is characteristic, as his use of the abovementioned term, “one organic whole,” signifies.

¹¹¹ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, Volja prema umu, *Napredak*. Tečaj 43 (1902), 234.

¹¹² Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1906, 49.

¹¹³ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1902, 313.

¹¹⁴ *Isto*, 228.

¹¹⁵ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, Psihološki tečaj obrazivanja, *Napredak*. Tečaj 40 (1899), 631.

¹¹⁶ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1906, 118.

He regards our character as the steady concord between our moral and our voluntary activity.¹¹⁷ The character especially is the highest degree of our male virtue¹¹⁸. Although from time immemorial, uncountable requests to educate the character have been raised, we have not yet completely become all our characters. As a result, he asks whether we could be the character, while exemplifying the traits of the character as the unity and consistency as to one principle or confidence.¹¹⁹ Two factors influence our character's education. One is our ethical principle, which is the external factor, and another is our own psychological and physical features, which are the internal factor. As the result of the struggle between these two factors, we could be our character. Therefore, we could rarely become so.¹²⁰ Here, we can perceive the difference from his preceding interpretations that our reason, as the result of our growth, acquires the recognition of God as our ethical principle. He interprets our ideal as the knowledge composed in accordance with our fixed purpose that originates from our pleasant emotions.¹²¹ Therefore, such an ideal has to struggle with our ethical principle. At this point, his opinion is similar with Arnold's.

As to Dvorniković's interpretation about our will, another characteristic is the concept of inheritance. In the long history of our civilization, our natural impulses have gradually become more adapted to the ethical principles necessary to maintain the existence of our society. He particularly emphasizes the historical importance of our having sustained an agricultural community. Agriculture compelled us to settle down and cooperate with each other. Through such experiences, care for our neighborhood emerged as one step in our socialization.¹²² As mentioned in chapter 1, I examined his opinion that our circumstances urge us to differentiate and that such differentiated traits could be inherited. As a result of our *social* life from generation to generation, we could possess a fixed inclination to be the character.¹²³ The basis for

¹¹⁷ *Isto*, 129.

¹¹⁸ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, Nešto o katakeru i karakternosti, *Napredak Kalendar* 1914, 156. Cf. anonym,-ov, published the same article in *Sarajevski list*. Therefore, I guess such an anonym is Ljudevit Dvorniković. -ov, Nešto o karakteru i karakternosti, *Sarajevski list* God. 30-broj. 38 (1907.3.31 / 3.18)

¹¹⁹ *Isto*, 159.

¹²⁰ *Isto*, 161.

¹²¹ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1906, 83-84.

¹²² Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *Nacrt socijalne etike*, rukopis, Istorijiski Arhiv u Sarajevu, Ostavština Ljudevita Dvornikovića DLj-42

¹²³ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1914, 161.

our mental activities is representative, namely the knowledge about our internal and external circumstances. We can inherit not such knowledge itself but rather the inclination produced by such knowledge as our adaptability to a fixed circumstance.¹²⁴ Acquiring new knowledge causes a differentiation in our nervous system and its repeated experience produces its inheritable inclination. Here, Dvorniković's thinking has a priority that contrasts with against the explanations of those who came before him, because his predecessors could not explain the difference between each child's intellectual and moral growth in so far as they rely on their interpretation that our will's development is intensively based on our intellectual growth. To teach the same object does not necessarily produce the same ethical inclination among children. Dvorniković, however, can explain such a difference. Our modern human being possesses a more fixed inclination toward an activity as a result of the inheritance of acquired characters. Nevertheless, to realize such an inclination requires two preconditions. One is the apperceived representative that stimulates such an inclination and the other is our nervous growth as the real basis for its expression. Therefore, teaching the fixed representatives alone cannot activate its inclination. Our repeated experiences should first make our nervous system grow.¹²⁵ Our modern baby cannot show his fixed inclination toward sociality as soon as he is born, even if he could hold such an inclination, because he still has not acquired his own nervous system for its realization.

The hypothesis that all children are a tabula rasa cannot explain the existence of difference in each child. From such adversity, the thinkers' regard turns into our history. Dvorniković's consideration of inheritance of our will or character could be placed in such a current interest in history at that time. The inheritance of our inclination enabled thinkers and philosophers to explain the atavism.¹²⁶ As a result, they insist that we should educate our characters as our source for all our ethical behaviors while considering each inherited inclination.¹²⁷ Nevertheless, they cannot sufficiently explain that difference if they only consider our cultural history by exclusively concentrating on our intellectual development. Here, Dvorniković introduces the regard into our nervous growth to defeat such an unconscious bias.

¹²⁴ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, O psihologiji pamćenja u nastavi, *Školski Vjesnik* 1902 Januar-Juni, 104.

¹²⁵ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, nav. djelo, 1899, 642.

¹²⁶ O pojavama slaboumnosti u djece, *Sarajevski list* God. 28-broj. 105, 1905.

¹²⁷ Radičeva, Mara, Obrazovanje volje, *Srpska škola* God. 2-svezak. 6, 1909, 232.

2-3. Concept of character in neo-scholastic thought

As far as our sense or reason can recognize something as being good, it forces us to want it. In contrast, as far as our sense or reason can recognize something as evil, it forces us to evade it. Such a force is our faculty of desire (*Begehrungsvermögen*).¹²⁸ All creatures inevitably become attracted by the object that perfects their own essential nature, because they cannot desire the objects contrary to their own essential nature. The actualization of each essential nature, namely essence, means each being's perfection, so it means goodness.¹²⁹ Our faculty of desire has three states. First, the impulse regulated by God, by which we desire the objects appropriate to each essence without recognizing this. This is not special because all faculties possess such impulse as urging our activities to realize. Second, the sensitive desire that we recognize our desired objects without knowing why we do so. Here, this desire wants the profitable or pleasant objects. Third, the rational desire that is based on our recognition of an object's suitability for our essence.¹³⁰ Although irrational animals hold a sensitive desire, our human being can control desire through a reason different from other creatures.¹³¹ Such rational desire is our will and its object is goodness, as far as our reason can understand.¹³² As mentioned above, the object of our rational recognition is not each individual object but its essence deprived of its matter as a principle of its individualization. Therefore, our will desires not each individual goodness but general goodness. Nevertheless, it could happen that the desire is evil in reality, because our will desires it as far as our reason can regard it as goodness. Although goodness has a decisive influence on the sensitive faculties when its goodness is based on the sensitive recognition, the goodness recognized by our reason can influence our will merely as a necessary condition. At the same time, we cannot desire unknown objects because we do not know them beforehand. As to this point, our knowledge is necessary for our will, although it is not its decisive cause. As far as our reason offers our will its objective or aim in advance, our reason could work on our will as its purpose.¹³³ For example, our body as an essential nature urges us to desire nutrition. Its satisfaction is good because of its suitability to our essential

¹²⁸ Stadler, Josip, *nav. djelo*, 1910, 255.

¹²⁹ *Isto*, 256.

¹³⁰ *Isto*, 257-258.

¹³¹ *Isto*, 260.

¹³² *Isto*, 262.

¹³³ *Isto*, 263-264.

nature. Still, it alone cannot decide whether we will eat beef or fish. Our knowledge gives us such options and our will itself decides ultimately. The source of our faculty of desire lies in its activeness in moving from its potential state to its actual state. Through its different ways of recognizing its objects, the faculty of desire is classified under the sensitive or the rational one.

As the ultimate judge of all activities, our will is free of all necessities. These are classified into two types. The internal necessity compels someone to desire fixed objects even if he behaves in accordance with his essence, while the external necessity is compelled externally in contrast to each essence. Our will is not restricted to some fixed activities according to its essence. As its result, our will can act or cannot act.¹³⁴ Nevertheless, our will should enter into the relationship with goodness as cause and effect, as the conclusion could be understood on the basis of its principle.¹³⁵ Our will is absent without its ultimate object. Our will is not completely free of the general goodness as its ultimate object. Our will is free only in as much as it makes a decision whether it desires its general goodness or not. Nevertheless, all activities desire the general goodness, so our will is not free with regards to our activities. Our will can freely select as to the special goodness.¹³⁶ Only God is a perfect goodness. We cannot completely recognize God, because we are contingent and variable beings. Therefore, God as recognized by us should be imperfect, so the goodness recognized by our reason cannot possess its force sufficiently to compel our will. The object we recognize as better could not necessarily become our will's object. Otherwise, we could not have any choice. In accordance with our view, the goodness alters itself. Namely the goodness for our sense is not the goodness for our reason. In so far, as our will is not conditioned by any fixed goodness, it can select one among the special goodnesses. Although in such ways our rational activity precedes our will, such rational activity is not practical but speculative. What our reason can tell our will is not that we *have to* choose it but that we *can* choose it.¹³⁷ As to the adequate condition for our will, we should consider that our will desires the general goodness according to its own essence and that what our will desires is only the represented object. Other than these two conditions, our will determines itself.¹³⁸

¹³⁴ *Isto*, 266.

¹³⁵ *Isto*, 268.

¹³⁶ *Isto*, 269-270.

¹³⁷ *Isto*, 270-272.

¹³⁸ *Isto*, 275.

The neo-scholastic viewpoint draws our character's importance from their belief that our human will is free. As far as we possess free will, we can make any decision or can select the option not to act. On the other hand, our character signifies the state in which we always behave ourselves in accordance with one principle regardless of any pressures. Then, we should hold a fixed will to aim at a higher purpose. Our character is based on the harmony between such a principle, our voluntary decision, and our actual activity. Such harmony could be generated by our body's obedience to our mind and then by our mind's obedience to God. This is our perfect character.¹³⁹ As far as our will is free, we can act opportunistically. However, such an attitude means our indulging in our sensual lusts while deviating from our rational desiring of God as a perfect goodness on the basis of our rational recognition. Therefore, one necessary precondition for our character's education is the intellectual growth that enables us to recognize the ontological relationship between our all imperfect being and God as one perfect being. Our intellectual development is the most indispensable presupposition to educate our character, although the neo-scholastic view recognizes that our will is free. Jesus Christ as its ideal is, then, the divinity incarnated through a human representative.¹⁴⁰ Thus, we should concretely endeavor to reach that ideal, so our struggle can occur between our sensual lust and our reason, in other words, between our body and our soul.

3. Human being as the precedent category

3-1. Individuality and history in Dvorniković's thought

Dvorniković asserts that our experiences have accumulated in accordance with our biological need to perceive our external circumstances and that such an accumulation has caused our differentiation historically, such that now our esthetic variety is generated. At this point, he regards our history as the process of our continuous differentiation. For him, our history is the incessant differentiation from one organic whole. Such representative is a part of his *Weltanschauung*: "No phenomenon in nature exists outside evolution. All those are linked to one organic whole at their origin. On the other hand, its differentiation causes the various phenomena".¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ *Isto*, 278-279.

¹⁴⁰ *Isto*, 280.

¹⁴¹ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1901, 56.

Dvorniković suggests the course of our history: “Any direct education, especially ethical education, runs into a stone wall since our human being began to aim at leading more perfect life. Moreover, any endeavor to civilize has collapsed. Therefore, we might recognize that our voluntary efforts to civilize could progress as far as the gradual and unchangeable development contributes to it”.¹⁴² We have already come across such a view in his thought about our character’s education. He reconciles those two versions with regard to history in the following way.

The evolutionary principle, evident in the entire nature, also shows itself in the gradual progress of our human civilization.¹⁴³ He regards such gradual evolution as the cause of the lack of leap in our development as a civilization. Moreover, he never limits such an evolutionary principle to the human field alone.

In his historical monograph, he examines cultural history, especially its branch of pedagogical thought, because such history aims to investigate the mental development of our general humankind: “The present state of our cultural human being is the result produced by our long-term development. Such development offers us the history of our general humankind”.¹⁴⁴ Our human being has to first consider our physical environment. Like other lives, our human being also should secure the order for his own existence. Such consideration is the germ for all later educational activities. Moreover, the appearance of our mental development separates us from other higher animals.¹⁴⁵ Here, we can see that Dvorniković also would regard our human being as a species that is different from other living beings. The range of our primitive education is limited to the satisfaction of our general human needs.¹⁴⁶

After such a primitive era, Hellenism appears. This period includes ancient Greece and Hellenism. During this era, our human being frees himself from our blind natural faith based on our reverence and the concept of human or individual dignity appears, although the system of the tribe is still maintained.¹⁴⁷ Therefore, the objective of the Hellenistic education is to realize each individual’s harmony ethically and esthetically.¹⁴⁸ In this context, Dvorniković believes that for our human being,

¹⁴² Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1905d, 21.

¹⁴³ *Isto*, 22.

¹⁴⁴ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *Uzgojna ideja u kulturnoj povijesti čovječanstva, prvi dio*. Zagreb: 1911, 5.

¹⁴⁵ *Isto*, 9.

¹⁴⁶ *Isto*, 17-19.

¹⁴⁷ *Isto*, 27-28.

¹⁴⁸ *Isto*, 30.

importance of educating character has come from its ancient Greeks: while exemplifying that we can discover the Pythagorean hypothesis of metamorphosis among all nations, “our cultural human being never changes in essence although situated in the various tribal environments through its historical stages”.¹⁴⁹

Nevertheless, such invariability in essence does not signify that time does not pass, since our human being grows. In Hellenism, Dvorniković perceives this new step in our intellectual ability. During this era, our human being endeavors to understand our relationship with nature from the universal view, because our blind reverence to nature disappears and our human dignity appears.¹⁵⁰ On the basis of the Platonic idea that our human being can perfect himself through his efforts to reach the eternal idea, Aristotle produces his more practical educational aim to acquire the harmony of all activities according to our developed recognition, while simultaneously noting our various tendencies.¹⁵¹ In this case, the state as our human community represents the goodness our human being should reach through our education.¹⁵²

The fall of Hellenism demolishes such a principle on the basis of a value. The new concept of goodness based on our individual subjectivity is generated by thinkers like the Epicureans and the Stoics.¹⁵³ Such individualism is also a characteristic of the Roman education. In the Roman Empire, education becomes more practically rooted in each individual’s life. Therefore, Roman philosophers insist on the educational obligation to recognize each student’s traits and educate the students in accordance with such recognition.¹⁵⁴

Dvorniković calls this era, which lasted from our human primitive state to the Roman Empire “a chapter in the cultural development of our general human being”; thus, he likens it to “our human adolescent epoch (*vijek mladosti*).” That is why our human being starts his human historical life at that point.¹⁵⁵ From our blind obedience, which is the result of our immature perception of our external circumstances, our human being develops into the acquisition of a higher view of our relationship with our external circumstances so that we can objectively situate ourselves in our external environment. Simultaneously, this era signifies our historical process from

¹⁴⁹ *Isto*, 51.

¹⁵⁰ *Isto*, 52.

¹⁵¹ *Isto*, 61-71.

¹⁵² *Isto*, 63.

¹⁵³ *Isto*, 76.

¹⁵⁴ *Isto*, 89.

¹⁵⁵ *Isto*, 117.

one stage at which our external circumstances determine our value to another stage at which our human being reflectively recognizes our own value. Therefore, he likens this period to puberty in our individual growth.

We cannot understand his whole view of cultural history, because he could publish only the first part of his cultural history in 1911. Although unpublished, his manuscripts about the medieval era are present in the Archive of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Archive Collection of the Croatian School Museum. He perceives the medieval era as a stage in our life's path, while pondering over the Christian role in this period: "Social development during the medieval era is a mere continuation of its ancient world in essence. Our social development occurs in accordance with the unbreakable biological principle applicable to our entire human society".¹⁵⁶

The gradualness of intellectual development is not the only law in this world, although it may be observed everywhere. Another law is related to our innate inclinations based on our predecessors' experiences.¹⁵⁷ Our individual is not unconditionally a reproduction of our general human history but is a result of the accumulation of the precedent differentiations and experiences. Here, he points out that there is one impulse for the common existence, which is the basis of all human behaviors according to his understanding of our biological origin. Simultaneously, the principle of judging the value of an impulse is a result of the accumulation of the differentiated experiences in each historical environment. This is called the adaptation principle.¹⁵⁸ As a result, he denies equality among human beings: "Each human species (*rasa*) has a fixed limit that results from each external cultural influence, beyond which it cannot progress".¹⁵⁹ Such a limit means each innate inclination of each pedigree (*loza*) to which each individual belongs.

Dvorniković also insists that such a limit might be overcome when each individual acquires the new ability of cultural acceptance, owing to the accumulation of experiences produced down through the generations.¹⁶⁰ To the extent that we are human, we should all experience the same course of intellectual development: "All human beings could hold their same innate inclinations in each nation as well as in

¹⁵⁶ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *Uzgojna ideja u kulturnoj povijesti čovječanstva, drugi dio*, rukopis, Arhiv Bosne i Hercegovine, Napretkova kulturno-historijska zbirka, inv. 2373 odsj. 3, br. 2.

¹⁵⁷ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1905d, 24-25.

¹⁵⁸ *Isto*, 28.

¹⁵⁹ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1907 Septembar, 622.

¹⁶⁰ *Isto*, 1907 oktobar, 685.

each individual, if they could develop in the same circumstances”.¹⁶¹ Nevertheless, each different environment leads each human being to acquire different content from each experience.

While he interprets the present variety as the differentiations from an organic whole, he assumes a category of human beings between them. To understand the lifestyle of each nation and tribe is the guidepost to understand our general human culture and education, because the cultural differences observed among nations and tribes represent our development from our lower culture to the higher one.¹⁶² In such ways, we can perceive in each person a fixed order related to our general human development.¹⁶³ Although it is easy and secondary to perceive his contemporariness with the Western tendency to classify each individual according to their Western values, it is more important to recognize that he holds the oneness of our human being although approving our differentiation. Furthermore, he interprets such difference as the various degrees of our intellectual development, for he regards “our adolescent epoch” as the development of our recognition about our relationship with our circumstances.

While discussing Vjenceslav Novak’s novel *Tito Dorčić*, Dvorniković denies the specialized innate ability produced by the engagement within a fixed work down through the generations.¹⁶⁴ As to mental development, all human beings hold only two stages on the whole. One stage is acceptance, which includes memorizing and understanding. Another stage is creation, which includes thinking and making. All human mental activities can differentiate and multiply in accordance with each interest. Simultaneously, these various mental activities can, finally, be reduced to such two stages.¹⁶⁵ The variety of our mental phenomena merely reflects the differences in the objects of two such stages that all human beings possess in so far as we are human. The sentence cited above, “Our cultural human being never changes in essence, though situated in the various tribal environments through his historical stages,” is accompanied by another sentence: “We altered merely our surfaces in accordance

¹⁶¹ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1905d, 32.

¹⁶² Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1911, 14.

¹⁶³ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, Jedan kulturni problem, *Školski Vjesnik* 1907 juli, 465.

¹⁶⁴ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1907 novembar i decembar, 853-854.

¹⁶⁵ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, Jedan kulturni problem, *Školski Vjesnik* 1908 mart, 157.

with each current of the age”.¹⁶⁶ On the other hand, he claims that the paralysis of a particular ability relevant to each job results from the one-sided use of a fixed organ.¹⁶⁷

As to the differentiation, each evolution could be represented by the average mark of its whole. Moreover, the peculiarity observed in the deviation from such an average mark represents individuality. Furthermore, such a peculiarity can be absorbed into the whole through inheritance.¹⁶⁸ In such ways, Dvorniković does not think that each individual is opposed to each species. Our human intellectual and ethical development constitutes two steps. One step occurs in the ontogeny that each individual is generated through the accumulation of each different experience and impression and the other occurs in the phylogeny that the result that each individual acquires is passed down to the descendants, and finally to all human being.¹⁶⁹ Two concepts, our individual and human being, are merely two aspects of the same phenomenon, viewed from different angles. Individuality is the pioneer of the future species: “The empirical phenomena of each individual are the process of each trait’s socialization”.¹⁷⁰

3-2. Individuality and history in neo-scholastic thought

Although the universe is compound, it is not a mere mass but a unified order. The universe is variable and contingent because of its compound being.¹⁷¹ A mat-

¹⁶⁶ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, nav. djelo, 1911, 51.

¹⁶⁷ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, nav. djelo, 1908 Mart, 158.

¹⁶⁸ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, Individualnost u školi, *Školski Vjesnik* 1903 oktobar, 689.

¹⁶⁹ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, Pedagogija na razmegju stoljeća, u *Essay-i iz područja psihološke pedagogije i estetike*. Sarajevo: 1905e, 15. Cf. the concepts of ontogeny and the phylogeny originate mainly from Ernst Haeckel: “Die Formenreihe, welche der individuelle Organismus während seiner Entwicklung von der Eizelle an bis zu seinem ausgebildeten Zustande durchläuft, ist eine kurze, gedrängte Wiederholung der langen Formenreihe, welche die tierischen Vorfahren desselben Organismus oder die Stammformen seiner Art von den ältesten Zeiten der sogenannten organischen Schöpfung an bis auf die Gegenwart durchlaufen haben.” In comparison with Haeckel’s definition, Dvorniković broadens the meaning of the ontogeny. Ernst Haeckel, *Anthropogenie oder Entwicklungsgeschichte des Menschen. Gemeinverständliche wissenschaftliche Vorträge über die Grundzüge der menschlichen Keimes- und Stammesgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1903, S.7.

¹⁷⁰ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, nav. djelo, 1903 oktobar, 689.

¹⁷¹ Stadler, Josip, *Kosmologija*. Sarajevo: 1909, 10.

ter is created from others. Such others are not matter, because a matter can work on only another given matter. Similarly, matter cannot be created from the soul as a single being. A matter is created from the not-given. Therefore, God creates a matter from nothing as a primary cause.¹⁷² All beings in the universe should generate and change with time. The universe is created within and with time. Geology tells us that the present universe has become the environment appropriate to our human being through continual development through some thousand years. Such an ordered universe inevitably presupposes its order's founder, namely God.¹⁷³

Although the order could adopt its concrete form as it likes because the universe is contingent, such a universe has adopted the present order so that we can assume its fixed purpose. This purpose is to show the divine goodness, because one object cannot reflect the divine infinite perfection, and the almighty God can be represented more distinctly through the creation of numerous objects. Simultaneously, this order has to presuppose the existence of the rational being to recognize such a divine order. It is the ultimate purpose of this universe that such a being appreciates God.¹⁷⁴

This universe as a compound being consists of various beings, which are classified under the terms, inorganic, vegetation, animals, and human beings. The inorganic in this universe is the body, which consists of molecules. Molecules can be subdivided into atoms as the minimum physical unit.¹⁷⁵ The atom is a compound being, because it occupies its place in space.¹⁷⁶ Therefore, it consists of matter and form as a principle integrating its parts. Such form enables its matter to actualize as a body. Such matter is not regulated, so it is called the primary matter.¹⁷⁷ Although such a body can change, as our experience testifies, the primary matter is not concerned with which forms it should adopt. Therefore, the primary matter requires a substantial form in order to cause the primary matter to change. What is the substantial form for the inorganic? The substantial form is the purpose regulated by God as its rational creator.¹⁷⁸ This result of achieving such purpose signifies each organic's perfection. Such activity is to produce something within or outside its body. Furthermore, such activity lies in the potentiality within its body as the subject compounded of the

¹⁷² *Isto*, 15.

¹⁷³ *Isto*, 26.

¹⁷⁴ *Isto*, 31-33.

¹⁷⁵ *Isto*, 91.

¹⁷⁶ *Isto*, 93.

¹⁷⁷ *Isto*, 96-97.

¹⁷⁸ *Isto*, 119-120.

primary matter and the substantial form. Its change occurs by other forms.¹⁷⁹ The inorganic never acts by itself but produces its own activity according to its form, which God regulates as its purpose.

Vegetation consists of such a body and the life principle. Such a principle is generally called the soul. Vegetable life is nutrition, growth, and propagation. To perfect its vegetable body is its purpose.¹⁸⁰ Here, the term vegetable body does not mean its individual vegetation but rather general vegetation, like its genus or species. All types of matter are not living, so the life principle is the being different from matter. Such a vegetable life principle is a substantial and single form, although not independent, owing to its activity that is restricted by its vegetable body, because its principle exists as a substantial being after it unifies with the matter as its subject.¹⁸¹ Simultaneously, such restriction means that its vegetable life principle is regulated by its subject in advance.¹⁸²

All animals possess the need to subjectively acquire the objects as their nutrition. Here, the faculty to feel and desire is added to the vegetable life principle.¹⁸³ All animals can perceive each object and can sense corresponding to each sensitive organ, because they possess the nervous system. Besides sensitive memory, fantasy, and (un)pleasant emotions, animals have the faculty of sensitive recognition.¹⁸⁴ They cannot apply the sense to each concrete and material object if it is a single activity by the self. All activities occur owing to the single principle within the animal organism. Such activities actualize through the force that holds their concrete and material being. Therefore, the sense is restricted as the organic force only on the sensitive organ, so it exists within the compound being of the animal soul and its body.¹⁸⁵ Animals never possess reason or freedom, so they never evolve or degenerate.¹⁸⁶ Their activities are based on their essential nature, which is assigned by God. Through the sensitive representatives acquired through each sensitive organ, their sensitive faculty and motion faculty in potentiality are transformed into each ordered activity. Such

¹⁷⁹ *Isto*, 120.

¹⁸⁰ *Isto*, 123-124.

¹⁸¹ *Isto*, 128-129.

¹⁸² *Isto*, 130.

¹⁸³ *Isto*, 136.

¹⁸⁴ *Isto*, 137.

¹⁸⁵ *Isto*, 141.

¹⁸⁶ *Isto*, 142.

an animal soul is material because it depends on its body. Nevertheless, we can graft in vegetation, so the vegetable life is accidental and divisible in comparison with animals.¹⁸⁷

The various creatures we can observe in this world live as various individuals. Where are such various individuals generated? Each body's individuality is preceded by its cause as the subject: "The life principle is individual by itself as an essential form for the living being and can acquire its substantiality only within its organic individuality. Therefore, such a life principle can be created only within its individual, so God needs its organic individual before creating it".¹⁸⁸ This universe, although consisting of various such individuals, never falls into chaos. Such individuals order each other through their mutual relationships, just as vegetable photosynthesis contributes to all animals' lives. In accordance with each essence that God regulates, the inorganic, vegetation, animals, and human beings exist as an essential being. Therefore, individuality is merely accidental. The order of this universe is based on their essences. The metamorphosis theory fails logically because the higher form is within the lower form, as it insists that all lives exist continuously from the lower to the higher form.¹⁸⁹ Although we can observe the gradual development only within each individual of each species, no species can transform into another species.¹⁹⁰ Similarly, we cannot logically accept the Darwinian hypothesis, because it abuses the use of analogy and confuses accident with law.¹⁹¹ All general organic generations and all species' generations originate directly from the divine creation. The first individuals of each creature are created directly by God, and then, the propagations by such individuals enable the universe to be filled with the various species. In this regard, we can cite the facts that the present species are invariable and that an unbridgeable difference exists between vegetation and animals.¹⁹² The creation of this universe is accomplished to reveal the almighty God, as mentioned above. God is one and is also multiple. God holds everything within Himself as far as we can think. Therefore, this universe is one and is multiple, because it represents divine singleness and multiplic-

¹⁸⁷ *Isto*, 134-135.

¹⁸⁸ *Isto*, 162.

¹⁸⁹ *Isto*, 166.

¹⁹⁰ *Isto*, 168.

¹⁹¹ *Isto*, 171-173.

¹⁹² *Isto*, 174.

ity as the divine property.¹⁹³ We can understand that the species are mutually different beings because they represent such divine multiplicity.

The neo-scholastics only accept the growth within each individual to perfect each being. Therefore, this universe is invariable, although the individuals composing it change, because all individuals always hold such an essence that is given by God and in this way participate in composing a single and same universe through each being's perfection. Simultaneously, each individual difference within a species is accidental on the basis of each individual subject for each form.¹⁹⁴

Conclusion

Dvorniković can make our esthetic sense independent of recognizing the truth or goodness because he interprets it as the continuity with our physical sense. In particular, he focuses on individual differences in our esthetic sense. He explains that such differences originate from our differentiation in accordance with our adaptation to each environment. Simultaneously, the physical phenomenon of such differentiation is the differentiation of our nervous system based on the parallelism of our mental and physical phenomena. His *Weltanschauung*, the continual differentiation from an organic whole, is based on such a psychological understanding, in particular, his esthetics.

On the other hand, he places our character at the top of our ethical being. He also agrees with the opinion that the education of the character is the ultimate goal of education. He thinks that our individual should obey the imposed ethical laws in order to support the existence of our human society. Our individual inclinations might conflict with such ethics; hence, educating the character has been a difficult enterprise. Nevertheless, our civilized life across some generations can construct such an inclination within us as a way to blend our individual inclinations with such social ethics. In addition, such a new inclination in our society can be passed on to our descendants so that we can become our character more easily.

How does he explain the relationship between such differentiation and such socialization? He regards individuality as the quantitative difference from its average whole. Our human mental activity can finally be reduced to two stages, acceptance and creation. The individual difference originates from the difference between

¹⁹³ *Isto*, 34.

¹⁹⁴ Toma Akvinski (prev. od Tomo Vereš), O biću i biti, u Anto Gavrić (ured.), *Toma Akvinski Izabrano djelo*. Zagreb: 2005, 130.

the objects of these two stages or from the quantitatively functional difference from the average activity of both these stages. Therefore, the concept of the human being, based on two such stages, is eternally invariable.

For the neo-scholastics, the individual difference is generated from each subject as a fixed matter.¹⁹⁵ On this point, they rarely differ from Dvorniković in his view that our nervous differentiation is the physical expression of our mental difference. As to modern psychology, he asserts that its analysis starts from the presupposition that there is parallelism between our mental and physical phenomena, and then, accepts such a parallel structure while suspending research into the essence of our soul as a metaphysical problem.¹⁹⁶ In fact, he points out the difference between our mental inclination and the growth of nervous system to explain why the same intellectual education cannot produce the same effect among the children of the same cultural background. Nevertheless, I think that such a suspension can leave unconsidered in his whole thought the concept of the soul and that such a soul has a decisive influence. If he approached our mind materialistically, the alteration of our nervous differentiation would inevitably transform the concept of the human being as its form, because matter is form. Nevertheless, in reality, he situates himself within the parallel relationship, so he seems to be able to distinguish our human being as a form from our variable body, namely our individual, as its matter. He differentiates our human being from the higher animals on the basis of the so-called rational activity: “We can observe that the higher animals acquire and keep the representatives. Nevertheless, from such perceptive materials, our human being can only create new and higher mental products. At this point, our human beings progress further (*daleko od-makao*) from such higher animals”.¹⁹⁷ If we exchange his “new and higher mental product” with the intellectual or rational product, his thought about our human being is not far from that of the neo-scholastics. As mentioned above, he rather seems

¹⁹⁵ Although A. Topoljanin’s remark was published in an orthodox periodical, he plainly expressed such an opinion: “It is no wonder that our body is the same as that of animal, if we remember that all creatures are created through the soil.” Topoljanin, A., *Postanak čovjeka*, *Istočnik* God.16-broj 15 (1902.8.15), 364.

¹⁹⁶ Dvorniković introduced Dlustuš to the writings of Wundt, when Dlustuš rejected his treatise about the will, “written on the basis of modern psychology and experience.” *Pismo* 20. veljača 1901, AHŠM, HR-HŠM-50 Trstenjak Davorin, A-1913 *Pisma Ljudevita Dvornikovića*, Cf. Dvorniković states that Wundt approved of the parallel relationship between our mental and physical activities, although denied the identification of both. Dvorniković, Ljudevit, Vilim Vunt, *Školski Vjesnik* 1902 oktobar-decembar, 627.

¹⁹⁷ Dvorniković, Ljudevit, *nav. djelo*, 1906, 63.

to supplement and revise unintentionally such a defect in neo-scholastics' thought as the infinite increase of our faculties.

Various individuals are interpreted as the products of evolutionary differentiation. The difference in the degree of intellectual development enables Dvorniković to distinguish our human being from animals, although he acknowledges that the evolution occurs continuously from an organic whole. Furthermore, the concept of the human being, with only its time aspect of such growth, has existed as an invariable form. Here, the reduction of the various phenomena to two stages, acceptance and creation, contributes to such a concept of the human being. Therefore, we can regard one group, which holds a fixed degree of intellectual ability, as our human being, while identifying such a degree of ability as the same mental function eternally. Other human beings could be classified under other species. The species human being is eternal in its form, so we can never hit on its revision. If we give such a human being a more concrete name, for example, nation or race, we can make the chauvinistic essentialism. Our essentialism is the effect that results from our neglecting to discuss such a metaphysical relationship between our individuals and our human being as a species ■

KONCEPT ČOVJEKA U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI KRAJEM STOLJEĆA - Usporedba između Ljudevita Dvornikovića i neoskolastičara -

Sažetak

Moj cilj je bio da istražim izvor našeg esencijalizma u konceptu ljudskog bića na kraju stoljeća. Kao njegovu konkretnu temu, odabrao sam sukob darvinizma i neoskolastičara. Posebno analiziram odnos između Ljudevita Dvornikovića i Josipa Šadlera, jer je prvi radio na tome da zauzme mjesto u opoziciji prema neoskolastičarima. Dvorniković posmatra našu ljudsku historiju kao trajnu diferencijaciju. S druge strane, neoskolastičari, naročito Šadler, vide historiju kao rast unutar svakog roda. Iako je Dvorniković prilazio ljudskom biću historijski, njegova metafizička pretpostavka ga je sprječavala u tome da u potpunosti historicizira ljudsko biće. Njegova metafizička pretpostavka je misao da čovjek egzistira kao jedna rastuća vrsta. Na ovom mjestu on nenamjerno stupa u odnos sa svojim potencijalnim neprijateljima – neoskolastičarima. Mislim da je jedan izvor za esencijalizam tako strana koegzistencija diferencijacije čovjeka i nepromjenljivog, iako rastućeg, ljudskog bića ■